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Abstract: Open innovation is the systematic integration of collaborative, sourcing and revealing 
practices into a firm’s business strategy, which is not implemented at once, but through a 
journey. This paper investigates this subject in an emergent economy context, the Brazilian 
aerospace industry, presenting the critical analysis of a questionnaire-based survey performed by 
means of personal in-company interviews in 22 firms. It comprises a wide range of practices 
associated with open innovation, connected to a conceptual model. Open innovation elements 
were found in the sample, with no open business strategy behind them, though. Deficiencies 
regarding funding, R&D maturity and intellectual property protection prevent the cluster from 
being fully open innovator. The culture company in the sample was nevertheless found to be 
very prone towards openness. From that, we conclude that open innovation in the cluster is still 
“unfreezing”, but with great potential to emerge, once these problems are solved. 
 
Keywords: Open innovation, Aerospace Industry, Brazil, Innovation management. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper is about the applicability and importance of open innovation to the Brazilian 
aerospace industry. 
Open innovation is a term coined by Chesbrough (2003a) to designate a new mindset 
within industrial organization in which companies make use of “purposive inflows and outflows 
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of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of 
innovation, respectively” (Chesbrough, 2006: p.1). 
The subject of collaboration, networking and use of external sources for research and 
development (R&D) is not a novelty in academic and specialized literature about innovation 
management. Freeman (1991), in a review paper in the early 1990’s, has shown evidence that the 
use of formal and informal R&D networks and other kinds of collaborative arrangements are in 
order since before World War II. Freeman also states that the growth of structured networks of 
innovators, claimed by Chesbrough (2003b) to be at the root of the open innovation era, dates 
from the 1980’s. Also within new product development (NPD) literature, review papers on the 
subject prior to the rise of open innovation (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Liyanage et al., 
1999; Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001) identify a clear outward tendency in their time. 
In spite of all that, the coining of the term “open innovation” has brought to the literature a 
binding perspective on a number of existing practices, and the necessity to structure such 
practices into firms’ strategies. According to the OECD (2008), the novelty of the open 
innovation approach lies on this systematic integration of such practices into firms’ strategy, as 
well as on the exploitation of the outbound (inside-out) process by firms. 
It is evident that the adoption of open innovation is different from firm to firm, and from 
industry to industry. So it should be since the “optimum” level of openness depends on variables 
such as technology intensity, value chain position, product development average lead times and 
so on (Chesbrough, 2003b; West et al., 2006). According to Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007: 
p.58), a good open business strategy “balances the tenets of traditional business strategy with the 
promise of open innovation”. In other words, it is about the decision of what shall and what shall 
not be disclosed. 
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The adoption of open innovation does not happen at once, though. Enkel et al. (2011), for 
instance, developed a maturity level framework which identifies five stages of adoption of open 
innovation: (1) Initial/arbitrary; (2) Repeatable; (3) Defined; (4) Managed and; (5) Optimizing. 
Chiaroni et al. (2011), in their turn, classify the level of adoption of open innovation by 
means of a three-axed framework which they name “the open innovation journey”. In the first 
axe, the process of adoption of open innovation is split into three stages: the first is the 
“unfreezing” stage, which implies in establishment of a sense of urgency of change and a cultural 
shift towards openness, although not yet put in practice. The second, called the “moving” stage, 
concerns the actual implementation of change through the establishment of new procedures and 
patterns of behavior consistent to the new vision derived from the cultural shift. Finally, the third 
one is the “institutionalising” stage, which is achieved when open innovation is incorporated to 
the formal procedures and internal business process maps, with its own metrics and subjected to 
continuous improvement procedures. The second axe is with respect to the direction of openness: 
outside-in and inside-out (the first usually precedes the latter). The third axe regards the 
structuring of managerial levers for open innovation, namely: (i) networking, (ii) organizational 
structures, (iii) evaluation processes and (iv) knowledge management systems. 
From these two papers, one realizes that it is not just a matter of determining whether open 
innovation is adopted or not, but also of establishing at which step one sits. This question can 
also be posed in the industry level. 
Another issue identified in the emerging open innovation literature is that although the 
concept has been presented as a general trend (sometimes even as a paradigm change), what is 
observed in practice is that open innovation publications are clustered into a few “open-
dominated industry segments” (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007), where the evidences of 
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openness are more clearly found. Another limitation is that most of the studies published so far 
analyze open innovation in the context of developed economies (especially the U.S. and the 
European innovation systems) as first noticed by West et al. (2006), which persists to date. 
That being said, this paper has therefore a double-edged purpose: the first one is to present 
the descriptive analysis of the results of a survey whose goal was to search for evidences of open 
innovation trends within the Brazilian aerospace cluster. The second goal is to answer, in an 
explorative basis, and based on the data from the same survey, the following two research 
questions: 
(i) Does open innovation makes sense for companies of the aerospace industry in 
Brazil? 
(ii) How mature are companies in the cluster towards open innovation? 
In other words, the goal behind this work is to verify whether collaborative and 
outsourcing activities within this industry are indeed part of an open business strategy or not, and 
where companies sit within the open innovation journey framework. This is an important issue to 
be addressed, for most publications on open innovation ignore the importance of business 
models, as West and Bogers (2013) noticed in a recent review paper on open innovation 
literature. 
The relevance to this work lies on the previously mentioned lack of literature about open 
innovation in developing contexts. Moreover, there is a worldwide interest in Brazil since 2003, 
when Goldman Sachs’s paper about the BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) economies was issued 
(Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003). One finds a number of publications which show evidences 
of openness within developing economy contexts, but there is no conclusive answer so far 
whether this issue should be managed in the same manner they are in developed countries. 
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Moreover, the open innovation literature lacks studies about more traditional high-
technology segments, since most of the evidence found is from industries where innovation 
dynamics is more intense, such as the ICT (information and communications technology) and the 
pharmaceutical sectors. The aerospace industry is an example of such an industry for which one 
finds few studies that discuss open innovation.  
In order to fill both gaps, this paper presents the result of a research project that took place 
between 2011 and 2013 to investigate Brazilian aerospace companies in search of open 
innovation patterns within their R&D and NPD strategies. This work’s results and findings shall 
add to the current discussion concerning the dynamics of these “new entrants” in the global 
market. 
The remainder of the article is therefore organized as follows. Section 2 presents an 
overview of the Brazilian aerospace industry and its journey towards openness. Section 3 
presents the research methodology employed to investigate the subject, which includes a 
conceptual model and the structuring of a survey. Section 4 shows the main results and performs 
a descriptive and critical analysis of the data obtained from the survey; Finally, Section 5 draws 
some conclusions, summarizes this paper’s contributions and makes suggestions for future 
investigation on the subject. 
 
2. The Brazilian aerospace industry and its path to R&D openness 
A striking paradox in the Brazilian aerospace industry is that, although the country is proud 
to have Alberto Santos Dumont (1873-1932), a Brazilian-born inventor, among the pioneers of 
flight, the establishment of the industry has happened much later and did not occur 
spontaneously, but by means of government intervention, The creation of the Brazilian aerospace 
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cluster in the city of São José dos Campos, strategically located in between São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro, the two largest metropolises in the country is the cornerstone of the national aerospace. 
It was accomplished by the establishment, in the mid-twentieth century, of the aeronautic 
research institute Centro Técnológico de Aeronáutica, nowadays called Departamento de 
Ciência e Tecnologia Aeroespacial (DCTA), and the Air-Forces engineering college Instituto 
Tecnológico de Aeronáutica (ITA) in the city (Ferreira, 2009; Gomes, 2012). Later on, in 1971, 
the establishment in the same city of the Brazilian space research institute (INPE – Instituto 
Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais) consolidated São José dos Campos and surroundings as the 
heart of the aerospace cluster in Brazil. The history of most Brazilian-owned aerospace 
companies is connected to these public institutes, as they are either spin-offs of these institutes, 
or have their founders coming from ITA, DCTA or INPE. That is the case of Embraer, Mectron 
and Avibras, to name a few. 
Aerospace is subdivided into three segments: aeronautics, defense and space (IMAP, 
2011). Undoubtedly, the main segment within the Brazilian aerospace in terms of revenues is 
aeronautics as Figure 1 shows. This is mostly due to Embraer, a global leader in the regional jets 
segment. In 2007, for instance, the aeronautic segment was responsible for 92.9% of total 
revenues in the Brazilian aerospace market, of which 84.5% is attributable to Embraer (Ferreira, 
2009). 
 
Source: adapted from Ferreira (2009). 
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Figure 1 Brazilian aerospace market share in 2007 
Not neglecting Embraer’s importance to the cluster, the Brazilian aerospace industry may 
not be reduced to one single company. There are several other niche markets exploited by a 
number of different companies acting in the country that must be taken into account. One such 
niche market is the helicopter manufacturing segment, which is exploited by Helibras, a 
subsidiary of EADS Eurocopter, the only helicopter manufacturer in Latin America. There is 
also a number of smaller aircraft manufacturers that develop and produce smaller vessels for 
agriculture, flight training and leisure. 
The defense and space segments in Brazil are highly segmented, with small and medium 
enterprises acting in very specific niche markets, related either to civil and military air control 
infrastructure, or to the modest but relevant Brazilian space program or yet to other initiatives 
that have the government as the demander and purchaser. 
In all three segments, though, the role of the government is central for funding and 
supporting product development projects, beyond its role as purchaser and final user. This is 
acknowledged by local authorities, which consider the aerospace industry as a strategic segment 
for the national development plan for several years (Gomes, 2012). Although strategic, 
throughout their history, aerospace companies often find a hard time regarding public support to 
develop its own technologies and products. This is partly due to the novelty of the regulatory 
framework for innovation in Brazil, whose cornerstone is the so-called ‘innovation law’ (federal 
law 10.973/04), issued in only in 2004.  
As a result, despite the country has a distinguished competence in this industry globally, 
the cluster is very dependent on foreign knowledge, even for the prime contractor Embraer. 
When analysing Embraer’s supply chain, one realizes that 93% of its suppliers are located 
abroad due to the lack of qualification of local suppliers (Figueiredo et al., 2008). According to 
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Cassiolato et al. (2002), the risk-sharing partnership model adopted by the company to develop 
its aircrafts since the mid-1990’s was the solution Embraer found to gain access to the 
technology within the systems provided by its suppliers. 
As for Helibras, since its establishment in the late 1970’s, its business model was basically 
based on the manufacture and sale of aircrafts developed by its controller Eurocopter. More 
recently, though, the company is engaged with R&D, thanks to some technology transfer 
agreements from Eurocopter that put the Brazilian subsidiary in charge for the development of a 
couple of platforms. This R&D is being performed in collaboration with local universities and 
public research institutes (Caiafa, 2012). 
Finally, regarding defense and space segments, the very structure of the market leads 
companies to collaboration, since their very small economies of scale and scope hinders them to 
invest in self-dependent R&D infrastructures. Collaboration is one of the few alternatives for 
survival in this scenario. One such example was the Atech-Omnisys joint venture for the 
development of the first 100% national S-band weather radar, which resulted in the spin-off 
Atmos Systems (Silveira, 2005). Another example was Mectron’s collaborative arrangement 
with Brazilian and South-African enterprises for the development of the fifth-generation missile 
A-Darter (Silveira, 2009). 
Recently, these segments are attracting the interest of new and bigger entrants, such as the 
French company Thales, which controls the Brazilian firm Omnisys since the acquisition of 51% 
of the company in 2005 (Mileski, 2011), and the Swedish Saab, which launched R&D facilities 
in Brazil in 2011 (Pedroso, 2011), anticipating its victory in the fighter jet bid from the Brazilian 
Air Forces (Soto and Winter, 2013). Another important change in the segment’s panorama was 
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Mectron’s acquisition by Odebrecht group, the largest Brazilian company in the construction 
sector (Rolli, 2011). 
The research project that follows takes place within this dynamic environment, of 
alliances, partnerships, mergers and acquisitions, also characterized by secrecy and concealing 
due to the involvement of the military and matters of national sovereignty. 
 
3. Method 
The literature exploring the adoption of open innovation practices in aerospace is rather 
sparse and close to inexistent. Therefore, this work aims at performing an extensive investigation 
of open innovation concepts, tools, practices and strategies in order to verify which have been 
adopted in aerospace product development. For that purpose, a questionnaire-based survey was 
performed covering all relevant aspects related to an open innovation strategy. 
After gathering some information about the firm itself, the questionnaire inquires about 
general technology innovation management (product and process innovation), using the 
framework of OECD’s Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat, 2005). The most extensive part of the 
questionnaire, though, is about open innovation issues. Departing from the tripartite division of 
open innovation proposed by Enkel et al. (2009) one elaborates a list of the pertinent issues 
associated to each core processes, presented in Table 1. 
In order to analyze ‘when’ and ‘how’ open innovation occurs within product development 
process, a conceptual model is built, based on the three phases of the R&D process according to 
the Frascati manual (OECD, 2002). The resulting model, presented in Figure 2, identifies the 
internal “products” within the three activities of the R&D framework, that is, knowledge as basic 
research’s main output, technology for applied research and products for development. The 
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combination of such assets are the ideas, here defined as creative impulses that allow the 
combination of existing data, information, knowledge and technologies into new knowledge, 
technologies, products and/or processes. 
This conceptual model, along with the issues identified in Table 1, serve as a guide for the 
elaboration of an extensive survey questionnaire that structured the interviews performed during 
data collection. 
Table 1 Open innovation issues 
Core process Issues associated 
Outside-in 
External knowledge/technology sourcing 
Integration of the customer and/or user in the innovation process 
Integration of the supplier in the innovation process 
Licensing in 
Spin-ins, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
Inside-out 
IP portfolio activity 
Licensing out 
Spin-offs and divestments 
R&D outsourcing 
Coupled 
Co-development with other companies 
Collaboration with universities and other science and technology institutes (STI) 
Venture capital 
11 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Open product-development conceptual model 
Moreover, in order to cover for the open innovation journey, the questionnaire also 
inquires about open innovation culture (to evidence the “unfreezing” phase), formal business 
processes (for the “moving” phase) and open innovation metrics (for the “institutionalising” 
phase). 
The final result is a very comprehensive questionnaire that comprises 71 questions, which 
took in average one hour and a quarter to be filled during interviews. 
 
4. Results and analyses 
The survey sample comprises a total of 22 Brazilian aerospace companies engaged in R&D 
activities and high degree of maturity in the product development process (Oliveira and 
Kaminski, 2012). These companies provided detailed information between the years 2007 and 
2011. Data collection was performed through personal interviews with R&D managers or 
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directors responsible for the innovation process management within the company. All interviews 
were performed in-company. 
The sample is representative of the population under study. The official Brazilian 
aerospace catalogue CESAER (DCTA, 2011) comprises a list of 270 companies. However, when 
analyzing the catalogue, one realizes that this list includes companies that, although part of the 
aerospace supply chain, are not indeed aerospace companies. After filtering out these companies, 
one finds 150 aerospace companies. The catalogue includes a brief description of each 
company’s activities, which allows one to perform a second filtering, retaining only those 
engaged on R&D activities. By doing so, only 59 firms are left in the population. Therefore, the 
sample obtained represents about 37% (22/59) of the population of interest for this study. 
The aerospace industry comprises companies with varying expertises, for aerospace 
products embrace many different technologies. Looking up the distribution within the dataset, 
the largest proportion of firms lies in the electronic and avionic systems, followed by aircraft 
manufacturers/integrators and technical consulting firms. The others are specialized in satellite 
components, defense equipment, ICT/software, simulation equipment and mechanical 
machining. The small size of the population prevents us from disclosing the exact numbers of 
each category. 
The sample can also be split according to the firm value chain position. Four positions are 
generally considered: prime contractors, equipment manufacturers, subcontractors and final 
users. No final users are found within the sample, for they are not part of the focus of this study. 
Regarding the other three positions, Figure 3 shows the distribution considering three scenarios: 
(i) the entire aerospace industry (150 companies), (ii) R&D-engaged firms (59 firms) and (iii) 
this survey’s sample (22 firms). 
13 
 
One realizes that the survey’s subset oversamples the final links of the chain (prime 
contractors and equipment manufacturers), even when compared with the R&D-engaged subset. 
 
Figure 3 Firm distribution with respect to value chain position 
Turning now to size representativeness, in this study a firm is considered an SME if it has 
500 employees or less globally (that is, accounting all plants around the world). The distributions 
are shown in Figure 4. Following the trend observed in the value chain position analysis, the 
sample studied in the survey is more focused on larger firms, when compared both to the whole 
industry population or to the share engaged with R&D. Nevertheless, more than 3/4 of the 
sample is composed of SMEs, which means that their position is undoubtedly captured in the 
analyses that follow. 
 
Figure 4 Distribution according to firm size 
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4.1. Innovation management 
The first section after the introductory questions to the characterization of the sample 
focuses on traditional innovation management indicators, as established by the Oslo Manual 
(OECD and Eurostat, 2005). Although this manual distinguishes four different types of 
innovation (product, process, organizational and marketing), this survey concentrates only on 
technology product and process (TPP) innovation. All data covers the period ranging from 2007 
to 2011. 
As one can infer from Figure 5, no single company claimed to be engaged only in process 
innovation, which indicates that innovation within this industry (or at least within the sample 
under analysis) is product-oriented. This is further confirmed by Figure 6, which shows that the 
impact of product innovation tends to be higher when compared with that of process innovation. 
This corresponds exactly to what Pavitt (1984) defines as a science-based industry, in which he 
classified the aerospace industry. 
 
Figure 5 Types of innovation 
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Figure 6 Highest innovation impact 
Besides product and process innovation indicators, a common metric for innovation 
performance are intellectual property (IP) protection tools. Table 2 shows the percentage of 
companies within the survey sample that used IP protection tools in the 2007-2011 period: the 
proportion of firms using formal methods (e.g. patents) is low while strategic methods, such as 
secrecy and complexity of design, are more often used in the sample. This result follows a 
Brazilian tendency, partly due to well-known shortcomings in patent registration in the country 
(Brito Cruz and Mello, 2006; Gosain, 2013); but also due to the relatively low ratio of world-
level product innovations in the Brazilian aerospace cluster. 
Table 2 IP protection methods 
Type of protection IP protection method Sample 
Formal methods Patents and utility models 18% 
Trademarks 23% 
Registration of industrial designs 5% 
Strategic methods Secrecy 55% 
Complexity of design 45% 
Lead-time advantage 18% 
 
It follows from this low-adoption ratio of IP protection tools that Brazilian aerospace 
companies are in general not quite structured to deal with IP issues. As Figure 7 shows, more 
than 3/4 of the sample claimed either not to have any IP issues or to deal with them informally, 
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when they occasionally occur. Only 14% of the respondents claimed to have a Technology 
Transfer Office (TTO) or equivalent, responsible for managing and solving IP-related issues (9% 
in the plant where the interview took place and 5% in the firm, at a different plant). 
Figure 7 IP management 
Regarding at last the use of governmental support policies for innovation, Figure 8 
summarizes the adoption of a number of policies in the survey sample. The information that 
stands out is that more than half of the companies in the sample are users of non-refundable 
resources (grants) for innovation projects. Federal innovation agency FINEP and São Paulo state 
research agency FAPESP are the main culprits for this high rate, due to their well-established 
innovation support programs: “Subvenção Econômica” from FINEP and “PIPE – Pesquisa 
Inovadora na Pequena Empresa” from FAPESP, the latter addressed to small enterprises (with 
less than 250 employees). 
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Figure 8 Use of innovation public policies 
As for the other indicators, the percentage is relatively low. This is partly due to the 
novelty of most programs, since they were in general enabled by the Brazilian innovation law, 
issued in 2004. 
4.2. Product development and open innovation 
Recalling the conceptual model shown in Figure 2, the questionnaire begins the open 
innovation section of the survey by inquiring where companies act across the R&D spectrum. As 
expected, all companies in the survey claimed to be committed to development activities. About 
2/3 of the sample claimed to perform applied research internally. As for basic research, only 9% 
of the companies claimed to perform such activities in Brazil and other 9% claimed to perform it 
globally (in others plants) but not in Brazil.  
In order to perform this R&D, firms often find inspiration from others sources of 
knowledge. Figure 9 draws a radar diagram of the average importance attributed to a number of 
types of players that often contribute to R&D. Since the number of samples that claimed to be 
engaged to basic research was very low, the radar comprises and compares only applied research 
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with development. The importance was given through a seven-point Likert scale with no central 
point. 
 
Figure 9 Importance of players as sources of knowledge for R&D activities 
Some interesting observations can be made from the comparison between the two 
remaining shapes drawn in Figure 9: 
• Internal R&D personnel are the most important, regardless of the R&D stage; 
• Firms from different industrial sectors are barely used as sources of knowledge for 
aerospace companies, regardless of the phase; 
• Science and Technology Institutes (STI), such as universities and research labs are 
more important during research activities than for development; 
• Industry players, especially clients and suppliers are of great importance during 
development, but less important during the research phase. 
Among the same list of players, companies could name up to two players as the most 
useful for their respective R&D. Figure 10 shows the frequency at which each player was cited.  
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Figure 10 Top-of-mind partners for R&D 
Three players stand-out in this analysis: clients (59%), universities (50%) and suppliers 
(36%). Interestingly, the option “firms from other industries” is a choice that no respondent 
made, which corroborates the low importance of cross-industry collaboration for the segment. 
4.3. Open innovation strategy 
As mentioned in the introductory part of this paper, a recent review paper on open 
innovation research (West and Bogers, 2013) observed that there is a tendency on open 
innovation research to neglect the importance of open business models and strategies, in spite of 
their importance to distinguish open innovation from earlier research on interorganizational 
collaboration in innovation. Opposing such tendency, this research dedicates a full set of 
questions to investigate how openness is connected to the firm strategy and their respective 
business models. 
According to Dahlander and Gann (2010), there are two types of strategy for open 
innovation: pecuniary and non-pecuniary. Pecuniary strategies consist of external practices 
directly related to acquiring or selling companies, the first an inbound activity and the latter 
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outbound. Figure 11 shows that a very low percentage of companies claimed to be engaged in 
this kind of practices in the 2007-2011 period, in both directions. 
 
Figure 11 Strategic pecuniary practices related to the acquisition or selling of firms 
The low percentages may be attributed to the low importance of such practices inside 
aerospace companies’ strategies, or may be due to the small time span of analysis (5 years), since 
merger and acquisition (M&A), spin-offs and divestments in most cases are not part of the 
ordinary agenda of companies, and their lead time is often greater than other open innovation 
practices. 
In order to cover for that, the survey also inquired about former involvement of the plant in 
M&A, divestment or spin-off processes, whose result is found in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 Plants previously involved in M&A or divestment processes in the past 
With that approach, a larger M&A incidence is found within the sample. Therefore, even 
though 64% of the companies in the sample claimed they have never been involved with these 
matters, this result shows that this subject should not be disregarded when analyzing the 
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Brazilian aerospace cluster, as 36% of the firms surveyed resulted from divestments, spin-offs or 
were merged or acquired by another company. 
Turning now to non-pecuniary practices, these are related to sourcing (inbound) and 
revealing (outbound) processes (Dahlander and Gann, 2010). One first example of such strategy 
is licensing in or out. Figure 13 shows the percentage of companies in the sample that claimed to 
have performed licensing during the 2007-2011 period. 
The information that stands out is that not a single company in the sample claimed to have 
out-licensed their internal IP in this five-year period. In the inward direction there were positive 
responses, but most of them are for the acquisition of specific development software tools or 
embedded software for the company’s own products. Figure 14 indeed shows that a high (70%) 
percentage of licenses are due to software development firms. 
 
Figure 13 Licensing in and out 
When inquired about the importance of licensing activities for the company strategy, on a 
Likert-scale from 1 to 7 (where 1 means ‘not important’ and 7 means ‘very important’), the 
average remained below 2. Therefore, one concludes that this kind of open strategy is not 
adopted by firms in the sample. 
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Figure 14 Type of organizations from which IP is licensed 
Another non-pecuniary revealing strategy is the provision of R&D services to third-parties. 
Now this is a practice that is found to be of great importance among surveyed firms. As Figure 
15 shows, roughly 3/4 (73%) of the firms claimed to perform this kind of activity, and close to 
half (41%) stated to perform this practice with great intensity. 
 
Figure 15 Proportion of firms providing R&D services by frequency 
The clients of these R&D services (Figure 16) are mostly local, or located within the 
country, with low international incidence, which indicates that collaboration is performed within 
firms’ own networking links. Moreover, only 1/3 of such services are provided within 
collaborative arrangements in a strict sense, the remaining 2/3 are direct-contracted services for 
the development of parts for third-parties, in almost all cases, public institutes such as INPE, the 
DCTA or one of the many divisions of the Brazilian Air-Force Command (COMAER). 
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This kind of practice, performed through direct-contracted development services, show a 
poor adherence of the open innovation model to the modus operandi of these companies: first, 
they are not performing R&D to develop their own products, but providing R&D services for a 
living, by outsourcing their own technical expertises to third parties; second, the collaboration 
that is performed cannot be considered a partnership in the strict sense of the word, it is more 
akin to a supplier-customer relationship; third, there is not an open business strategy behind the 
decision of balancing the disclosure and revealing of internal knowledge and technologies. 
 
Figure 16 Location of R&D service clients 
On the other hand, in line with Tranekjer and Knudsen (2012), the very provision of 
technical services to their customers grants these companies updated technical knowledge and 
privileged information about the market, which is crucial to their survival in the market, but also 
represents a source of opportunities to these companies to develop their own products. As a 
matter of fact, 68% of the R&D service providers in the sample claimed to use federal or state 
grants to finance the transformation of internal expertise into own products. 
What differs from Tranekjer’s and Knudsen’s (2012) findings in Denmark is that Brazilian 
aerospace R&D-service providers are not better product innovators in comparison to 
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nonproviders, since these firms often fail to accomplish the successful launching of such product 
innovations in the market. Three R&D-service providers in the sample reported the exact same 
complaint about the effectiveness of the use of public grants for innovation: Brazilian authorities 
lack uniformity in their purchasing policies of aerospace technologies, which makes it difficult 
for local companies for profiting from their own NPD initiatives, since opportunities identified 
today may not be confirmed as a purchase order when the product is ready for deployment. 
4.4. Open innovation culture 
Even though open innovation may not be a reality in many aspects of Brazilian aerospace 
firms’ behavior or strategy, its principles may yet be present in their internal culture. This is what 
Chiaroni et al. (2011) refer to as the “unfreezing” phase, which is addressed in the last part of the 
survey questionnaire. 
By means of a series of questions about the importance of a number of aspects, the survey 
is able to identify which open innovation practices are more related to the day-by-day routine of 
the company, and therefore to its culture. The cultural facet is also something that often open 
innovation research papers lack, according to West and Bogers (2013). 
In Figure 17, the level of importance attributed to each practice is shown in a 1-to-7 scale, 
since all questions were graded through a seven-point Likert scale (with no central point), and 
grouped by the three core processes (Enkel et al., 2009). As hinted from the results previously 
presented, there is a higher predominance of outside-in practices, followed by coupled activities 
and inside-out practices scored the lowest, with the exception of R&D services, as previously 
discussed. 
Performing a simple average of the importance attributed to each practice within the three 
processes shown in Figure 17, one obtains overall indices of 3.3 for outside-in, 2.6 for coupled 
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and 2.0 for inside-out practices. Not surprisingly, outside-in scored highest, followed by coupled, 
and inside-out with the lowest score, which is consistent to a number of open innovation 
publications (e.g. OECD, 2008; Gassmann et al., 2010; West and Bogers, 2013) that assert that 
there is a dominance of the outside-in process over the others. 
 
Figure 17 Open innovation practices as part of the day-by-day of Brazilian aerospace firms 
The final question to be asked at this point is whether this scenario is consistent to a 
journey towards innovation openness. Since averages could be deceitful, one alternative is the 
creation of dummy variables to determine whether companies adopt each one of the three core-
processes. To that effect, all three indices from all surveyed firms were put together, and the 
median value (found to be 2.7) was set as the threshold for determining whether a particular open 
innovation process is part of the culture for each participating firm. Afterwards, firms were 
grouped according to the processes that were found to be present at their respective cultures. 
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By doing so, it was found that there is a pattern of adoption of open innovation processes. 
A group of companies (about 29% of the sample) was found not to adopt any of the three 
processes, which were labeled as “closed innovators”. A second group of companies comprises 
those with one single process found within its culture. Outside-in only innovators were found in 
this group, which correspond to 5% of the sample. Among dual-process open innovators, two 
situations were found: outside-in is present in both cases, while the adoption of the second 
process differ: 14% of the sample adopts inside-out as well, while 43% of the companies, the 
largest group in this classification system, were clustered as outside-in and coupled adopters. 
Finally, there is the completely open innovators group that accounts for 10% of the sample, 
which puts together companies that were found to adopt all three core processes. This 
classification system allows the sketch the open innovation path illustrated in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18 From closed to open: the journey of Brazilian aerospace firms 
Outside-in is the first process to be incorporated into a firm’s culture; pure inside-out or 
within coupled arrangements is something that arrives only after outside-in is established into the 
firm’s culture. This finding is consistent to what Chiaroni et al. (2011) found in Italy. 
With respect to the process of adoption of openness within the open innovation journey 
framework, this survey’s questionnaire investigates the existence of a department formally 
responsible for open innovation processes and about the reference to open innovation activities 
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in formal business process procedures of the firm. In both cases the incidence of positive answers 
was low (36%), even though the questions were structured in order to find the slightest evidence 
of these rather than fully operational open innovation management. 
The questionnaire also includes a few questions intended to verify whether “not-invented-
here” (NIH) and the “not-sold-here” (NSH) syndromes (Chesbrough, 2003a) were present in the 
firm’s culture. According to the responses provided during the interviews, a very low presence of 
these syndromes was found in Brazilian aerospace companies: only 4.5% of the companies in the 
sample were diagnosed as affected by NIH and 9.1% by NSH. These answers clearly indicate a 
willingness to perform more collaboration and outsourcing than these firms actually do. 
All these results allow one to conclude that open innovation is indeed present within these 
firms’ culture, although not fully implemented in their strategies, internal procedures and market 
activity. It places the cluster in general in the “unfreezing” phase of the open innovation journey. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aims to identify the level of integration of open innovation within the product 
development process. Open innovation is an emergent mindset that is being observed in some 
technology segments, the so-called open-dominated segments (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 
2007). Within this new mindset, firms become increasingly aware of external knowledge to be 
used in internal technologies and markets, as well as external opportunities for application of 
internal knowledge in different markets. The body of knowledge that is being constructed in the 
specialized literature is mostly based on the study of success cases within these open-dominated 
segments, mostly within the context of developed economies. 
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With that in mind, this research paper attempts to analyze the applicability and relevance of 
open innovation within a different product development context in comparison to what is 
normally focused on the exploratory literature of open innovation. The focus here is the Brazilian 
aerospace industry, a traditional high-tech industry within an emerging economy context, which 
is characterized by one large player (Embraer) and a large network of smaller companies, mostly 
concentrated in the cluster located in São José dos Campos and surroundings. 
Through an extensive survey, this research was able to raise some interesting data to add to 
the open innovation literature. This survey was performed by means of personal in-company 
interviews with 22 aerospace companies in the cluster, based on a questionnaire elaborated after 
the conceiving of a conceptual model to integrate open innovation to NPD, and a profound 
literature review for raising all pertinent issues within an open business strategy. 
Traditional innovation metrics, defined by the Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat, 2005), 
have found in general a product-oriented low to medium innovative performance, with low IP 
management structuring, low-adoption of public innovation policies and local impact. The 
prominent relation is the supplier-customer relationship, followed by the collaboration with STI. 
The latter, though, is much more relevant during research activities and less intense during 
development phases. Besides, very low interest in collaborating with companies from other 
industrial segments was found. Collaboration was also found to be more intense locally. Finally, 
an awkward rate of R&D services provided through direct contract shows that many interviewed 
companies do collaborate, but not as a strategy for enhancing their own technologies and 
incomes, as advocates the open business model (Chesbrough, 2006; Chesbrough and Appleyard, 
2007). 
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In short, all these results seem to lead to the conclusion that collaboration in this industry 
follows traditional standards, and that it is not fully adherent to an open business strategy, as 
defined by Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007). When analyzing the internal culture of the 
companies in the sample, though, it was found that companies are willing to collaborate more 
and to adopt more complex models for innovation and for sourcing and revealing outwards their 
own boundaries. However, institutional gaps in the Brazilian cluster prevent this willingness to 
become a reality. Among these gaps, the insight from some respondents point towards the lack of 
uniformity of the government in its role of purchaser and the prevention of companies from 
performing R&D for the development of their own products, which in part is due to the first gap. 
All this is found to be adherent to the open innovation journey framework proposed by 
Chiaroni et al. (2011): the Brazilian aerospace cluster is undergoing an openness process, but still 
in the “unfreezing” phase, in which the sense of urgency for opening has been established, but 
institutional gaps prevents the clear adoption of an open business strategy. Therefore, the study 
presented in this paper is able to provide answers, in an exploratory basis, for both research 
questions asked in the introductory part of the paper: (1) yes, open innovation makes sense in the 
Brazilian aerospace cluster, although (2) the firms in the cluster does not seem to be very mature 
in dealing with open innovation, as they are still framed in the unfreezing phase of adoption. 
Although this research focuses only one industrial segment (aerospace), from one single 
emerging economy country (Brazil), its results contribute for the general understanding of 
emerging economies in general, from an inductive perspective. The general panorama described 
in the data presented in this paper shows an industry with some very strong points from the 
knowledge and absorptive capacity perspective, but with structural gaps that prevents this 
potential to be fully developed. To change this scenario, effective government measurements are 
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in order, to allow local companies to be able to develop their own technologies and products. For 
such, more than just offering funding alternatives, the government should revise its role as 
purchaser of aerospace technologies, and grant local companies a stable demand in the medium 
term that provides a stable ground for them to grow. On the other hand, there is also a step to be 
taken by local companies, to better organize their R&D structures, in order to reach higher NPD 
maturity, with less informalities and more consistent strategies. Currently, the industry sits on a 
vicious cycle, where companies do not invest in R&D more because of lack of government 
support and the government do not support local companies because they lack R&D structure. 
As a final remark: one should be aware that all these results are based on a simple average 
of the results obtained from the interviews, accounted equally regardless of firms’ income. If the 
results were weighted with respect to income, a much different scenario could be found, because 
one player (Embraer), if present in the sample, would overshadow the whole sample, which is a 
problem normally found in studies that analyze the Brazilian aerospace industry: it is a common 
mistake to assume that the Brazilian aerospace industry resumes to Embraer alone. The focus 
intended for this paper is precisely the opposite. Regardless of having Embraer in the sample or 
not, what is desired here was to analyze the reality of the industry as a whole, including the needs 
of all those small players normally neglected in business sectors analyses. 
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